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Abstract 
 
 
 
Nongovernmental actors influence negotiations with insider or outsider strategies. 
Academics are valued by government delegates for the neutrality and expertise they 
can provide as policy advisors to facilitate negotiations. This article examines the in-
fluence of academics on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change negotiations in 2009 and concludes that influence is comparable across is-
sues, but heterogeneous. For academics, influence depends on four qualitatively 
measurable indicators based on the prerequisite of access to the negotiations and 
knowledge regarding the current information needs: (1) when in the negotiation cycle 
academics provide input with the highest influence before the national position is 
formed, (2) on their personal capabilities like expertise and reputation, (3) on their 
policy-entrepreneurial activities and (4) their personal network to government dele-
gates and especially the ability to become insiders with access to negotiation text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  
UNFCCC, academics, NGO, influence, insider, climate politics, policy entrepreneurs 
 
                                                        
1 Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Michael Mason and Richard Perkins for helpful comments 
and suggestions on earlier drafts. I would also like to acknowledge financial support from the 
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). 
2
 Corresponding author: k.m.rietig@lse.ac.uk 
 4 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 
Global concern about the consequences of climate change and the hope for a 
strong, binding international agreement under the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that would replace the Kyoto Protocol after 
2012 and limit global warming to less than 2 degree Centigrade reached an unprece-
dented peak in December 2009 in Copenhagen. The Bali Roadmap called for a new 
agreement at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) and the world expected 
governments to deliver on this target. Consequently, over 30,000 people including 
20,000 members of civil society participated,3 making COP-15 resemble a “global 
development summit”.4 Despite the efforts of climate diplomats who met for negotia-
tions over six to eight weeks annually negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement, govern-
ments were unable to deliver on the Bali roadmap. Heads of states discarded the ex-
tensive text and compromise proposals prepared and a small group of states drafted 
the Copenhagen Accords,5 which were ultimately acknowledged by COP-15.6  
Yet, the question arises what effect and influence7 the high number of partici-
pating nongovernmental actors had on the negotiation process and outcome. The ex-
traordinary extent of nongovernmental actor involvement in the international climate 
change regime is the result of a participatory process initiated by UN member states 
                                                        
3
 UNFCCC 2010a. 
4
 Interview with government delegate from Latin America, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
5
 Friis, Lykke. Europe in the new energy world order. Public Lecture at the London School of Econom-
ics and Political Science, London, 19/10/2010. Retrieved 16/8/2011 from 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx
?id=759. 
6
 Copenhagen Accords 2009. 
7
 “Influence” does not mean NGO roles or strategies (Betsill 2001, 70) and is separate from tools such 
as power (Betsill and Corell 2008, 24). It is the fulfilment of negotiation objectives on different levels, 
e.g. if the negotiation results mirror the negotiation objectives and would not have occurred otherwise 
(Betsill and Corell 2001, 71). Following Betsill and Corell (2008), this article defines influence as 
“when one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s behaviour from what 
would have occurred otherwise” (Betsill and Corell 2008, 24). 
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over 20 years ago.8 The report “Our Common Future”9 marked the beginning of non-
governmental actors playing an increasingly important role in the negotiations for in-
ternational environmental agreements, especially at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development 199210 and the 1997 UNFCCC conference in Kyoto.11  
With reference to the regime theoretical framework for evaluating NGO influ-
ence by Michele Betsill and Elizabeth Corell12 this paper explores the questions of 
when, how and under what conditions academic nongovernmental actors influenced 
the 2009 UNFCCC negotiation cycle and contributes to the ongoing academic project 
of evaluating the influence of nongovernmental actors on environmental negotia-
tions.13 The case study focuses on the influence of insiders at the example of academ-
ics as they represent an under-researched group compared with other nongovernmen-
tal actors.14 
The first section offers a categorization of UNFCCC-nongovernmental actors 
into four distinct groups who each influence the negotiations differently. The second 
section discusses factors determining the influence of academics based on the Bet-
sill/Corell framework. Both the roles played and the timing can be seen as addition to 
the existing issue-focused analytical framework and contribution towards comparabil-
ity across cases of nongovernmental actors pursuing insider strategies.  
 
 
                                                        
8
 Interview with government delegate 2 from Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 15/12/2009, 
Copenhagen, UNFCCC.  
9
 UNCED 1987. 
10
 Jasanoff 1997, 579. 
11
 Betsill and Corell 2008, 46. 
12
 Betsill and Corell 2008, 34ff. 
13
 Andresen and Skodvin 2008; Betsill 2008a and 2008b; Betsill and Corell 2001, 2008, 2008a and 
2008b; Burgiel 2008; Corell 2008; Corell and Betsill 2001; Humphreys, 2008; and Vormedal, 2008. 
14
 For detailed and central analyses of the influence of academics on environmental negotiations and 
epistemic communities see Adler and Haas 1992; Auer 1998; Haas 1990, 1992 and 2004; Jasanoff 
1990; Stone 2000; and Zito 2001. 
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Typology of nongovernmental observer organizations at UNFCCC  
 
NGOs are influential actors in international environmental negotiations.15 As 
admitted observer organizations at UNFCCC, NGOs are non-profit and not part of 
government.16 They organized themselves into nine constituencies with other NGOs 
who share their norms, values or interests17 to facilitate communication with the 
UNFCCC secretariat via focal points and to coordinate information exchange.18 Based 
on their objectives, strategies and values, these nine constituencies can be classified 
into four groups with distinct characteristics.19 When their delegates join government 
delegations or closely collaborate with government delegates, they become insiders. 
Outsiders have no or limited personal contact to government delegates. Each group 
pursues insider and/ or outsider strategies that influence the negotiations differently. 
 
Advocacy Nongovernmental Organizations 
The largest and most visible group consists of nongovernmental actors pursu-
ing an advocacy strategy targeted at influencing the negotiations in a way that helps 
them achieve their objectives. It involves Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), Youth 
NGOs (YOUNGOs), Trade Unions (TUNGOs) and NGOs concerned with the inter-
                                                        
15
 For detailed discussions and analyses from International Relations and Environmental Governance 
perspectives see Albin 1999; Arts 1998; Andanova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009; Auer 1998 and 2000; 
Betsill and Corell, 2001 and 2008; Biliouri 1999; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Corell and Betsill 2001; 
Depledge 2005; Falkner, Stephan and Vogler 2010; Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Hasenclever, 
Mayer and Rittberger 2000; Jasanoff 1997; Najam 1998; Newell 2000; Princen and Finger 1994; 
Raustiala 1997; Wapner 1995; Yamin 2001; Yamin and Depledge 2004; and Zürn 1998. 
16
 Yamin and Depledge 2004, 58. 
17
 UNFCCC 2010b. 
18
 UNFCCC 2010b; and Yamin and Depledge 2004, 49f. 
19
 The following categorization is based on evidence triangulated from data collected through partici-
pant observation as NGO representative in 84 constituency meetings, workshops, working groups, con-
tact groups, plenary sessions and briefings by the chairs to civil society by the author at UNFCCC in 
November 2009 (Barcelona), December 2009 (Copenhagen), April 2010 (Bonn) and June 2011 
(Bonn); 25 semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives, a survey with responses from 51 
NGO representatives from all constituencies conducted by the researcher in July 2010 and 21 semi-
structured interviews with government delegates to process trace the influence of NGOs.  
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ests of women, indigenous people (IPO) and farmers. Advocacy NGOs can influence 
negotiations with both insider and outsider strategies. They are insiders when joining 
government delegations, but frequently remain outsiders to achieve their objectives by 
exerting pressure on democratic governments via demonstrations with support of the 
media. This strategy aims at influencing government delegates to reconsider their ne-
gotiation position. They are partial, action-oriented and frequently organized as a ne-
gotiation bloc. Their “shared principled ideas or values (…) [and] strategies aim to 
use information and beliefs to motivate political action”.20 The Climate Action Net-
work (CAN) is the most visible example of such a transnational advocacy network. 
 
Business and Industry Nongovernmental Organizations 
 
The second group consists of business and industry nongovernmental organi-
zations (BINGOs) that advocate their specific position and predominantly engage in 
lobbying activities. The spectrum ranges from banks and renewable energy companies 
to airlines and the fossil fuel industry with different interests.21 Although they ex-
change views and sometimes pool resources when sharing objectives, BINGOs are 
less organized into a negotiation bloc than the first group as they differ significantly 
from each other in their objectives based on the companies they represent. Individual 
BINGOs have a strong network to parties and enjoy close links to their national gov-
ernment delegations, thereby providing them with a semi-insider status. Financial ca-
pabilities, provision of jobs and the significant role in the implementation of climate 
agreements provide BINGOs with considerable bargaining power.22 
 
                                                        
20
 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 30. 
21
 Vormedal 2008. 
22
 For a detailed analysis of BINGO influence see Vormedal 2008 as well as Burgiel, 2008.  
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Local Governments and Regional Authorities 
 
 Local Governments and Regional Authorities (LGRA) are crucial partners of 
national governments in implementing climate targets and frequently enjoy a quasi-
insider position. They include majors as representatives of cities with more inhabi-
tants than many states. LGRA frequently join government delegations as their NGO–
classification hinders them from actively participating in informal negotiations and 
presents challenges when access for NGO representatives is restricted.  
 
Research and Independent Nongovernmental Organizations 
 
While all above nongovernmental organizations engage in advocacy for their 
objectives either individually or in close collaboration within their negotiation blocs, 
the research and independent nongovernmental organizations (RINGOs) as fourth 
group occupy a somewhat distinct position as their representatives are characterized 
as neutral authorities with frequently powerful advisory roles. RINGO is the third 
largest constituency, with 98 registered organizations23 such as universities, research 
institutes, think tanks and other educational NGOs. Approximately 100 further or-
ganizations have RINGO characteristics with their delegates regarding themselves as 
RINGOs,24 but have not yet formally affiliated themselves with the constituency. 
Their delegates can be characterized as interested students, researchers, established 
academics and experts who contribute constructively by providing research input and 
advice to other delegations, but do not necessarily share the same position on issues.25 
The constituency status was granted to RINGOs at COP-9 in 2003, after 35 founding 
                                                        
23
 RINGO 2010b. 
24
 Survey results for RINGOs; conducted by researcher, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
25
 RINGO 2010a, and Interview with RINGO delegate 1, 14/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
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member institutions formed the RINGO group and submitted a request to the 
UNFCCC secretariat to be considered as a constituency at COP-8.26  
As members of epistemic communities that can influence the coordination of 
policy when operating through transnational policy networks,27 RINGO delegates 
possess certain characteristics that distinguish them from other NGO representatives. 
They are independent organizations whose consensus is on the commitment to and 
norm of objective peer-reviewed research and the exchange of knowledge to facilitate 
negotiations, but not to represent a unified position on an issue. RINGO contributions 
to facilitate negotiations are frequently peer-reviewed research for the IPCC assess-
ment reports.28 Government delegates consider RINGOs an impartial, neutral norma-
tive authority since they provide information that is not biased towards serving certain 
interests, but objective with policy-making implications.29 The next sections argue 
that academics – like BINGOS - are most influential when they are insiders instead of 
merely observing outsiders, as the next sections will demonstrate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
26
 Yamin and Depledge 2004, 55. 
27
 Haas 1992, 33; furthermore Adler and Haas 1992; and Zito, 2001 provide an excellent analysis of 
epistemic communities. 
28
 IPCC 2007; and RINGO 2009. 
29
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview EU delegate 1, 
10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Japan, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; 
interview with delegate 1 from Least Developed Country, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
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Analytical Framework and indicators for influence  
 
Many studies on NGOs regard academics and nongovernmental actors in gen-
eral as influential actors,30 but few provide an analytical toolset to distinguish between 
different intensities of influence. This helps determine where and when frequently 
scarce financial resources can be used most effectively. The research and data gather-
ing strategy of this article is based on the analytical framework for measuring NGO 
influence developed by Michele Betsill and Elizabeth Corell,31 which was tested in 
several empirical studies.32  
The Betsill/Corell framework distinguishes between influence on the negotia-
tion process and the outcome of the conference. Three indicators influence the nego-
tiation process: issue framing (how actors understand an issue), agenda-setting, and 
influence on the positions of key actors. The analysis gathers evidence of the empiri-
cal case and process traces it from the actors’ behavior to the communication that oc-
curred between the NGOs and parties. When aggregated, the indicators of procedural 
and substantive issues determine the NGOs’ overall influence.33 The process tracing 
analysis reveals whether NGOs have successfully influenced the five indicators. The 
overall influence is low if NGOs engaged in activities aimed at influencing the nego-
tiations but did not succeed at any of the indicators, medium when they were able to 
shape the negotiation process in some of the process-indicators, and high if they had 
                                                        
30
 See Albin 1999; Arts 1998; Andanova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009; Auer 1998 and 2000; Biliouri 
1999; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Depledge 2005; Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Jasanoff 1990 and 
1997; Najam 1998; Newell 2000; Princen and Finger 1994; Raustiala 1997; and Wapner 1995. 
31
 Betsill 2008b; see also Betsill and Corell 2001 for an earlier version. 
32
 Vormedal 2008. 
33
 Betsill and Corell 2008, 34f. 
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success in shaping the negotiation process and their participation can be linked to the 
outcome.34 They called for further research to achieve comparability across cases.  
The empirical data collected by the author35 according to the framework on the 
influence of academics in UNFCCC between 2009 and 2011 confirms the usefulness 
and accuracy of the framework for determining nongovernmental actor influence re-
garding the process tracing and different levels of influence, however it suggests an 
extension to examining nongovernmental actor influence on single issues36 with a fo-
cus on capabilities, timing and roles for two reasons. First, the climate negotiations 
are highly complex with their multiple issues being negotiated simultaneously. Sec-
ond, for a post-2012 agreement to emerge, all issues under consideration need to be 
resolved. Consequently, an analysis focusing on the influence of one nongovernmen-
tal constituency on a single issue provides only limited insight into the overall influ-
ence of the NGO constituency on the negotiations.  
 
Actor-based indicators to determine expert influence  
 
To influence the negotiations, four prerequisites need to be fulfilled (Figure 1). 
The expert needs access to the negotiations.37 Second, there needs to be the opportu-
nity to communicate the information, which needs to be received and recognized by 
the government representatives38 in the form of publications, position papers, brief-
                                                        
34
 Betsill and Corell 2008, 37f. 
35
 Participant observation as RINGO representative in 84 constituency meetings, workshops, working 
groups, contact groups, plenary sessions and briefings by the chairs to civil society at UNFCCC in No-
vember 2009 (Barcelona), December 2009 (Copenhagen), April 2010 (Bonn) and June 2011 (Bonn), 
13 interviews with academics, a survey with answers from 36 academics conducted by researcher in 
July 2010 and 21 interviews with government representatives. 
36
 Betsill 2008b, 184. 
37
 Betsill 2008b, 192f. examines the importance of access and points out that influence does not decline 
when access is restricted. However, this is only the case if nongovernmental actors have the necessary 
capabilities and an existing network of government delegates to circumvent access restrictions. 
38
 Betsill and Corell 2008, 24. 
 12 
ings or direct meetings. Third, the expert must be informed about the state of the ne-
gotiations and the government’s delegations positions to transmit relevant and useful 
information to them. Fourth, for the input to be considered by the government dele-
gates, international standing, recognition as expert in the field and expertise on the 
topics government representatives lack is crucial.   
Influence corresponds with what would have happened without the involve-
ment of experts, during the negotiation process (medium influence) and on the nego-
tiation outcome (high influence).39  
The influence of academics on the negotiation process and the outcome de-
pends on four qualitatively measurable indicators: (1) when in the negotiation cycle 
they provide input, (2) on their personal capabilities such as expertise and reputation, 
(3) their policy-entrepreneurial activities and (4) their personal network to govern-
ment delegates to become insiders by joining government delegations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39
 Betsill and Corell 2008, 31f and 37f. 
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Figure 1. Indicators to determine influence. Compiled by author. 
 
Indicator Scale of 
evidence 
high/low 
Prerequisite for influence: 
 
• Access to negotiation setting 
• Opportunity to communicate position and to be heard 
by government delegates 
• Be informed about recent developments in negotiations 
and key government’s positions 
• Expertise on negotiation topics (have something to con-
tribute), international standing and recognition as ex-
pert  
 
 
Additional factors: 
 
- Timing: Communication with government before na-
tional position is decided 
 
- Insider Status:  
• Member of delegation 
• Access to informal negotiations 
• Access to negotiation text 
• Access to and consulting of decision makers before and at 
high level segment 
 
- Policy entrepreneurial strategies (proactive, activate 
networks, build coalitions) 
 
- Personal capabilities (relevant expertise and ability to 
present it successfully to government delegates) 
 
 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early/Late 
 
 
High/Low 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
 
 
Active/  
Inactive 
 
High/ Low 
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Influence is not absolute, but rather depends on these factors on a scale rang-
ing from low to high influence. The earlier academics are active, the better they influ-
ence a government’s position. The more expert and established the person is, the 
higher the influence (personal capabilities). The more active and engaged the expert is 
in networking and distributing creative ideas, the higher is the influence on the policy 
entrepreneurial influence indicator. This corresponds with the insider status in terms 
of the more senior the expert is in a powerful delegation, the better (‘high’ if all ac-
cess-indicators are answered with ‘yes’). 
Figure 2 summarizes the qualitative indicators and their position to each other 
on a scale from low (center) to high influence (outside). The figure below summarizes 
the qualitative indicators. The higher the overall influence is, the larger the area 
within the figure and more diamond-shaped the connection between the four indica-
tors is (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Indicators to determine low/medium/high influence: 
- Timing in the negotiation cycle (the earlier the better) 
- Personal capabilities (the more expert and established, the better),  
- Policy entrepreneurial strategies (the more active and engaged networker with creative ideas, the better) 
- Insider (the more senior within powerful delegation, the better) 
Compiled by the author. 
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Relevance of roles played by academic non-governmental participants  
 
The influence of academics and experts on government delegations is hetero-
geneous and depends on the different roles they play. There are four types of RINGO 
delegates: interested students, researchers, established academics, and experts. The 
capabilities and motivation of an academic determines their role. The decisive capa-
bilities are the academic network,40 excellent preparation, research background, abil-
ity to provide expert knowledge on a technical issue in demand, and the personal net-
work between the delegate and government representative.  
 
Participant Observer 
 
The most common position assumed by RINGO delegates is “observer”, the 
classic role according to the UNFCCC.41 There are two types of observers. The first is 
the interested student who primarily visits side events and observes the negotiations 
without actively participating. The second type is the “researcher” who observes the 
negotiations for the purpose of gathering data via interviewing delegates, administer-
ing surveys or collecting reports/publications. By definition, observers participate po-
tentially for the first time, are not members of government delegations, have very lit-
tle engagement with parties apart from casual conversations, and are unlikely to have 
significant existing networks with government delegates.42 Although observer access 
and participation raises the legitimacy and transparency of the negotiations,43 observ-
                                                        
40
 Bennett 1992. 
41
 UNFCCC 1996. 
42
 Survey of NGO participants, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
43
 Interview, delegate 2 from AOSIS, 15/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
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ers are also the target of criticism by some government delegates, since they “were 
only observing and taking up meeting space but (…) did not contribute positively or 
constructively to the negotiations”.44 However, one important concern of observers is 
to learn and gain an understanding of the process to become more involved in the fu-
ture.45 Observers remain outsiders with neglible influence on the negotiations. 
 
Networker with other delegations 
Networkers meet with other delegates from NGOs and government delega-
tions to exchange information, establish and strengthen relationships. All delegates 
usually undertake this activity.46 
 
Party Advisors 
 Advisors, who are also members of epistemic communities,47 provide scien-
tific expertise and information to government delegations in the form of speeches at 
side events attended by government delegates, and frequently engage in capacity 
building such as training diplomats.48 Researchers and established academics fre-
quently assume this advisory role. They remain registered as NGO delegates, but have 
a high status within their own delegation and a medium engagement with parties.49 
 Depending on their expertise and specific research background, preparation, 
personality, reputation, academic network, and personal network to parties, estab-
lished academics frequently join government delegations as advisors on a policy field 
                                                        
44
 Interview, delegate 1 from Latin America, 14/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
45
 Survey of NGOs, data for RINGOs, 7/2010, London, LSE; and Bernstein, 2002. 
46
 Survey of NGOs, data for RINGOs, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
47
 Haas 1992a. 
48
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010; Interview with delegate1 from Least Developed 
Country, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; Survey of NGOs, data for RINGOs, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
49
 Interview with delegate 2 from AOSIS, 15/12/2009; interview with delegate from Germany, 
12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; Interview with delegate from Ireland, 11/12/2009, Copenhagen, 
UNFCCC. 
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or even as negotiators on behalf of a country that is not necessarily their home coun-
try. Within the government delegation, they either act as advisors or negotiators and 
have high engagement with government representatives. The higher their status within 
the government delegation based on their expertise, reputation and need for capacity 
building within the delegation, the more likely academics are to become lead negotia-
tors on their area of expertise with direct access to the negotiating text.50  
Academics who gained insider status with government delegations and are 
thus representing a certain country at the negotiations frequently build bridges to non-
governmental actors with outsider status in workshops, at side events and in consulta-
tive processes. They interact with observers and carry their perspectives into their 
government delegation. Thereby, they can help academics with outsider status to in-
fluence the negotiations from within.51  
Consequently, a connection exists between the type of delegate, roles available 
to them, network to draw upon, and their influence. Figure 3 provides an overview of 
the connection between academic’s roles, activities, network and influence on parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
50
 Survey of NGOs, data for RINGOs, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
51
 Participant Observation by author, 12/06/2011, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
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Figure 3: Overview on connection between role, activities, network and influ-
ence of academics (compiled by author)  
 
Role Observer Networker with 
other NGOs/Parties 
Lobby-
ist Party Advisor 
Type of 
RINGO 
delegate 
Inter-
ested 
Student 
(IS), Re-
searcher  
Re-
searcher 
(R) 
IS, R 
Estab-
lished 
Academic 
(eA), Ex-
pert (E) 
IS, R, 
eA, E R, eA, E eA, E eA, E 
Negotiate on behalf of 
party, direct influence 
on and access to ne-
gotiating text Activities 
Obser-
vation, 
Visiting 
side 
events 
Obser-
vation, 
research 
Meeting/ exchange 
with other delegates 
Lobby 
parties: 
change  
posi-
tions 
Provide re-
search in-
put, capac-
ity building/ 
training 
Secon-
dary ne-
gotiator 
Lead ne-
gotiator 
Status to-
wards 
party dele-
gates 
Outside delegation Inside delegation 
Engage-
ment with 
parties 
Very limited Low Medium Medium Medium High Very high 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low             Influence of RINGO representative on parties                  high 
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Importance of personal capabilities and network to government delegates  
 
 
Influence depends on academic’s policy entrepreneurial strategies and if they 
achieve insider status with government delegations. Academics usually act as indi-
viduals and are not bound by a common advocacy goal or delegation position. As 
academics or experts they remain impartial and neutral observers of the negotiations, 
what gives them high credibility with government delegates. These value academics 
and experts as RINGO representatives for their expertise on certain topics and the 
neutral, scientific input they can provide to the negotiations.52 The networks with 
government delegates determine if they pursue an outside- or insider-strategy. 
Academics support government delegations with research in the form of ex-
pert briefings and published material. Developing countries with limited resources 
rely heavily on research input and capacity building to form their national position 
and prepare for the negotiations.53 The reason for the influence of academics is fre-
quently based on their positive contributions:   
RINGOs have definitively a very large input, since they can actually contrib-
ute something. BINGOs and ENGOs lobby, they want to have something 
from government delegates but do not have much to contribute. RINGOs, on 
the other hand, provide scientific input governments desperately need. When 
I walk through the NGO and government stalls here at Bella Center and 
waive a report with data on ocean warming and biodiversity studies and say: 
‘hey, do you want to have data?’ – No Government representative says ‘no’! 
They need the research input and use the data as arguments for their position. 
On the other hand, you can also convince them to do more and raise their tar-
gets with convincing and methodologically sound information.54  
                                                        
52
 Interview AOSIS delegate 1, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview EU delegate 1, 10/4/2010, 
Bonn, UNFCCC; interview delegate from Ireland, 11/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; interview 
delegate from Japan, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; interview with delegate1 from Latin Amer-
ica, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Nigeria, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, 
UNFCCC; interview with RINGO delegate 37, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC and interview with RINGO 
delegate 36, 14/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
53
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate 2 from 
Least Developed Country, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; participant observation/ statements of RINGO 
and state representatives at contact group on Arrangements for Intergovernmental meetings, 15/6/2011, 
Bonn, UNFCCC. 
54
 Interview with RINGO delegate 37, 14/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
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Consequently, academics’ contributions to UNFCCC negotiations are signifi-
cant and central to forming national positions and influencing the negotiations to-
wards an objective target of necessary mitigation and adaptation efforts. The tactics 
they use to communicate their contributions to government delegates can be catego-
rized as transmitting and receiving information, networking with delegates, capacity 
building and joining government delegations. The distinctive feature of academics as 
members of epistemic communities is their constructive contributions and supportive 
role for governments and other NGOs. They gain their legitimacy and recognition 
from this neutral, normative authority.55  
Joining government delegations grants academics access to the informal nego-
tiations and the negotiation text as well as access to senior decision makers. To 
achieve this level of access, they need to be proactive, build networks with govern-
ment delegates and establish themselves as neutral experts providing useful policy 
knowledge in demand: 
For technical details, we have RINGO advisors in EU delegations, especially 
where the ministries do not have the specialized expertise. (…) We also do not 
necessarily beg them to help us. We have a good relationship that is built on 
trust and personal relations with a number of experts, who frequently offer 
their opinions on proposals, provide us with data and policy recommendations. 
Usually they approach us with the information they have to offer, and we look 
at the information and use it to decide on our position.56 
 
Academic policy entrepreneurs had the highest influence on COP-15 and share 
a number of characteristics. They are established academics or experts from think 
tanks, have an excellent network to government delegations and a high reputation as 
                                                        
55
 Interview with RINGO delegate 36, 14/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate 1 from 
AOSIS, 10/4/2010; Interview with delegate1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with 
delegate 1 from Least Developed Country, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; Interview with delegate 1 from 
Umbrella Group, 11/4/2011, UNFCCC, Bonn. 
56
 Interview with delegate from Ireland, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
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neutral and unbiased scientists. Furthermore, as experts in topic areas under discus-
sion with a considerable publishing record, they provide technical input with policy 
implications. Their influence on the negotiations can be medium or even high if they 
join government delegations:  
I myself work for a Research NGO and I managed to get the government to in-
vite me to represent them here at the negotiations (…). Thereby I can make a 
big contribution to influence the negotiation process. I have been out there, done 
research in the field and know the data very well. I know what I am talking 
about and I can directly introduce the research results into the negotiation proc-
ess and thereby convince other governments I am negotiating with to do more. 
(…) I have direct access to the negotiation text. When I make a proposal in my 
contact group, the chair asks me how I would like to phrase the proposal, which 
should be agreed with other members of the Umbrella Group.57 
 
 
With their proactive approach academics offer expertise, further develop their 
networks between researchers/policy experts and governments, and establish research 
groups with potential policy implications.58 Their intrinsic motivation is frequently 
the desire to contribute to climate change mitigation. Hence, academic policy entre-
preneurs are at the heart of RINGO influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
57
 Interview with delegate 1 from Japan, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
58
 Interview EU delegate 1, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview delegate from Japan, 12/12/2009, 
Copenhagen, UNFCCC; interview with delegate1 from Latin America, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; 
interview with RINGO delegate 37, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
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Why timing matters – different levels of influence  
 
 
When in the negotiation cycle academics communicate their input to govern-
ment delegates is crucial. The influence is largest before the government has formed 
its position on an issue and the national parliament has ratified it. Once the position is 
formed and confirmed by common positions inside the negotiation bloc, it is ex-
tremely difficult to change a government’s position.59  
We especially need their input early in the process, directly after the last COP 
when we sort out the negotiation results and try to decide on our position for 
the next year. This position is then discussed with other governments in the 
European Council and then we agree on a EU position. Once the EU position 
is set, there is a very small margin to maneuver away from it anymore.60 
 
Academics can influence different levels of the negotiation cycle.61 The first 
step in the negotiation cycle is recognition of the problem and agenda setting on a 
national level. After the consultation and capacity building phase, the national 
position is formed. Once this position has been decided, usually on the parliament or 
government level, it is very difficult to change.62 Governments carry their national 
position into the regional organization meetings, where a negotiation bloc position is 
formed, such as within the EU, AOSIS, African Union or the Umbrella Group. Most 
join a larger negotiation bloc like the G77+China group, where they form a common 
                                                        
59
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010; Interview with delegate1 from EU, 10/4/2010, 
Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Germany, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; inter-
view with delegate 1 from Latin America, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; Interview with delegate 1 from 
Umbrella Group, 11/4/2011, UNFCCC, Bonn. 
60
 Interview with delegate from Ireland, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
61
 For references to different phases of negotiations see Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992a; and Putnam 
1988. 
62
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010; Interview with delegate1 from EU, 10/4/2010, 
Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Germany, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; inter-
view with delegate 1 from Latin America, 11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
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position in complex negotiations.63 During the Ad-hoc Working Group-level (AWG-
level) negotiations, countries meet frequently in their constituencies to discuss new 
proposals, leaving room for further input and changes in the bloc position. 
The process tracing of RINGO influence on the key indicators of shaping 
issues, agenda setting and influencing the positions of key states64 results in a very 
diverse assessment of influence depending on the stage of the negotiation cycle, with 
higher influence on the domestic level and declining influence towards the COP. This 
finding correlates with Andresen and Skodvin’s conclusions on the importance of the 
domestic level for the influence of nongovernmental actors.65 Influence on state 
positions also depends on how many ministries are involved in the process,66 the 
states’ capabilities67 and membership in certain negotiation blocs, how homogenous 
these blocs are and how legally binding their common negotiation position is.68 These 
determinants explain the variations in the influence of academics on different national 
and/or bloc positions (Table 4). 
Academics can have high influence on the national position early in the 
negotiation cycle, which declines towards the High-Level Segment and thereby the 
outcome.69 They provide scientific input and can set targets, since they are regarded 
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 Interview with delegate 2 from LDC, 11/4/2010; Interview with delegate 1 from Umbrella Group, 
11/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Vanuatu, 17/12/2009, Copenhagen, 
UNFCCC. 
64
 Betsill and Corell 2008. 
65
 Andresen and Skodvin 2008, 143f. 
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 Interview with delegate 1 from Latin America, 11/4/2010. 
67
 Interview with delegate 1 from LDC, 11/4/2010. 
68
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010; Interview with delegate1 from EU, 10/4/2010, 
Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Germany, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; Inter-
view with delegate 1 from LDC, 11/4/2010; interview with delegate 1 from Umbrella Group, 
11/4/2011, UNFCCC, Bonn. 
69
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010; interview with delegate from Germany, 
12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; Interview with delegate 2 from LDC, 11/4/2010; interview with 
delegate 1 from Umbrella Group, 11/4/2011, UNFCCC, Bonn; UNFCCC, 2009. 
 25 
as normative authorities.70 Governments invite them to contribute, provide a scientific 
basis and play a consulting role during the agenda-setting stage.71 In Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), academics frequently assume an even more active role in capacity 
building when they train government delegates on technical details and backgrounds 
such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), 
methodology for measuring emissions, technology transfer, and negotiation tactics.72 
They often join their government delegations later in the process as policy advisors 
and skilled negotiators on their behalf, e.g. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Sudan and 
Gambia. They influence the government position longer into the negotiation process, 
since they are deeply integrated with the delegation and can also contribute to forming 
the regional bloc position. The negotiations leave little opportunity for academics to 
influence the regional bloc position, which is frequently a politically bargained 
compromise between controversial state interests73 or even legally binding decision.74  
In conclusion, the conditions resulting in reduced influence on key actor 
positions are complex decision-making structures, political bargaining and legally 
binding pre-agreed bloc positions. A lack of expertise in ministries leads to demand 
for capacity building, presenting opportunities for academics to join government 
delegations as policy advisors and increasing their influence even after the national 
position is formed (Figure 4).  
                                                        
70
 Interview with delegate 1 from AOSIS, 10/4/2010; Interview with delegate1 from EU, 10/4/2010, 
Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate from Japan, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
71
 Interview with delegate from Ireland, 11/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; Interview with delegate 
from Nigeria, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
72
 Interview with delegate 1 from LDC, 11/4/2010; Interview with delegate 2 from LDC, 11/4/2010; 
Interview with delegate from Nigeria, 12/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC; Survey with RINGO an-
swers, 7/2010, London, LSE. 
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 Interview with delegate1 from EU, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC; interview with delegate 1 from Um-
brella Group, 11/4/2011, UNFCCC, Bonn. 
74
 Interview with delegate from Ireland, 11/12/2009, Copenhagen, UNFCCC. 
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Figure 4: Influence of academics on government positions (compiled by author) 
      Negotiation           
                  Bloc    
                (based on  
                   country  
                        data)  
Negotia- 
tion cycle 
EU  
(EU1, Ger-
many, Ire-
land) 
Umbrella 
Group 
(Japan, 
Umbrella 
Group1) 
AOSIS 
(AOSIS1, 
AOSIS2, 
Vanuatu) 
LDC 
(LDC1, 
LDC2, 
Nigeria) 
G77+China 
without 
AOSIS/LDC 
(Latin 
America1,  
UAE) 
Overall 
influ-
ence 
Recognition of 
problem/agenda 
setting 
High High High High High High 
Consultation, ca-
pacity building 
High High High High High High 
Formulation of na-
tional position 
Medium Medium High High Medium Medium 
Formulation of ne-
gotiation bloc posi-
tion 
Low Medium Medium Medium Low Low 
Change national 
position on AWG-
level 
None Low Low Low None Very 
low 
High-Level Seg-
ment meeting 
None Low None None None None 
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Conclusion on the influence of Academics in the 2009 UNFCCC negotiation cycle 
 
Academics had the highest influence very early in the 2009 negotiation cycle 
when the results from COP-14 were analyzed, the agenda set, issues framed and the 
national position decided, frequently between several ministries. The influence de-
creased closer to COP-15 as regional bloc positions were formed. A late window of 
opportunity only presented itself when RINGO delegates had direct access to the ne-
gotiation text as negotiators on behalf of a country. 
 Academics were able to influence the negotiations as they are considered 
normative authorities, contributing to capacity building with unbiased scientific re-
search input and frequently training delegates on technical issues. Some established 
academics and experts were especially influential because, as members of epistemic 
communities, they possessed very solid networks to government delegations. The use 
of these networks enabled them to directly influence the national position before it 
was formed and to later join government delegations as policy advisors or negotiators. 
Academics were influential if they were able to provide the required research exper-
tise, effectively communicate their findings to government delegations, and maintain 
the status of an established academic or expert with a high reputation.  
External conditions include the overall character of the negotiations and the is-
sues at stake. COP-15 was an “economic and development summit”75 with negotia-
tions on a post-agreement protocol that required behavioral changes from states. 
Those make it more difficult for states to agree76 as technical details and concrete 
proposals require commitment and difficult domestic implementation paired with un-
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 Interview with delegate from Latin America, 10/4/2010, Bonn, UNFCCC. 
76
 Betsill 2008b, 194ff. 
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popular decisions instead of open, principled political statements that can be inter-
preted and ignored. Hence, academics had less leverage to exercise their influence 
due to short-term economic interests. However, it also increased the demand for neu-
tral, scientifically based advice on technical details from established academics.  
Overall, academics had a medium influence77 as they made changes to the 
status quo on the process indicators of issue framing, agenda setting and partly chang-
ing the positions of key actors, however they were unable to influence the outcome 
(Copenhagen Accords) as this was negotiated by the heads of states. Figure 5 summa-
rizes the maximum influence established academics had on the 2009 negotiation cycle 
if they got involved early after COP-14 working proactively to provide government 
departments with their expertise and if they later on joined the delegation as negotia-
tor. Their influence was only medium and not high (dotted line; high influence is 
symbolized by a large diamond-shaped area) since they were excluded from the high-
level segment drafting the Copenhagen accords. If academics were only participating 
as interested students/observers or researchers, their influence remained low, symbol-
ized through a small diamond (Figure 6). They remained outsiders to the negotiations 
and as they joined late, their contribution remained limited, even if they used their ex-
pertise and policy entrepreneurial strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
77
 Critieria at Betsill and Corell 2008, 38. 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Medium influence of established academics and experts at COP-15;  
dotted line shows high influence. Compiled by author. 
 
Figure 6. Low influence of observers (interested students, researchers) at COP-15. 
Compiled by author. 
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Towards comparability of academic influence across issues 
 
 
This article examined when, why and under what conditions academics are 
able to influence international climate change negotiations at the example of 
UNFCCC COP-15 and contributes to the ongoing research project of achieving com-
parability of NGO influence across issues and cases. First, it provided a characteriza-
tion of four different types of nongovernmental actors involved in the UNFCCC. 
Nongovernmental actors can be categorized as Advocacy NGOs or Business and In-
dustry NGOs determined to convince government delegations of their positions, sub-
national actors who are especially concerned about implementation and academics, 
who are regarded as the only neutral actors and therefore especially valued by gov-
ernment delegates for their expertise and evidence-based contributions.  
 The article then presented four indicators of influence as extension to the ex-
isting issue-focused analytical framework of Betsill and Corell. The level of influence 
of academics can be determined by examining their activities according to their per-
sonal capabilities and expert knowledge, their policy-entrepreneurial strategies, how 
early in the negotiation cycle they are active and if they gain insider status within a 
key government delegation, what can enable them to contribute to forming the na-
tional and even bloc position as well as access the negotiation text. 
The research results on nongovernmental influence with a focus on academics 
hold further implications for theory development: Individual nongovernmental dele-
gates pursue either the insider- or the outsider strategy, depending on their capabilities 
and network to government delegations independent from their constituency or or-
ganization. In the case of academics, only the insider strategy with close contact to 
 31 
government delegates leads to influence on the negotiations, which is determined by 
their role, personal capabilities and timing. Mere participation in the negotiations as 
observer does not increase their influence. Research results and the list of partici-
pants78 further suggest that especially sub-national actors like local governments, 
business representatives and experts working for environmental NGOs such as the 
World Wildlife Fund and Oxfam also frequently join government delegations. Shell 
International representatives, McKinsey consultants and representatives of national 
industry associations were equally granted full access to high-level decision makers as 
members of the delegations of Indonesia or Papua New Guinea.79 Delegations taking 
on nongovernmental actors as insiders included powerful countries such as Brazil, 
France, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico or South Africa, what gives nongovernmental ac-
tors comparably high influence on the negotiations if they additionally pursue policy-
entrepreneurial strategies to convince their heads of delegation, form broad coalitions 
and convince veto-actors; advise early in the negotiation cycle and have high personal 
capabilities demonstrated by expertise on negotiation topics.  
This conclusion implies the comparability of nongovernmental actor influence 
across issues, cases and constituencies in environmental negotiations along their 
status as either insiders or outsiders. While individuals with certain capabilities can 
become influential insiders, outsider influence may be based on other factors such as 
their ability to mobilize mass demonstrations in cooperation with media to pressure 
democratic governments from outside the conference centers demanding climate jus-
tice and a fair, legally binding and strong post-2012 agreement on climate change.80  
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 UNFCCC 2010a. 
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 UNFCCC 2010a. 
80
 Survey, answers from ENGOs, 7/2010, London, LSE and 21 semi-structured interviews with gov-
ernment delegates to process trace the influence of ENGOs. 
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